Money Laundering and the Shadow Economy in Kazakhstan Introduction
The criminalisation of money laundering has emerged to become a new norm of international law and a core component of the governance of the world economy during the last twenty years. This development was given added impetus following the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the USA and subsequent attacks in the UK and Europe, since when the focus of money laundering measures has been redirected towards the financing of terrorist activities (Alldridge 2008; Levi 2002) . It remains a key area of negotiation between the nations of the West and those of the developing world, and has prompted a significant degree of harmonisation between national jurisdictions, as well as points of difference in policy and practice. And while public and political concern over the threat posed by the illicit legalisation of criminal assets remains significant, there are areas of uncertainty around this issue which impact in particular on developing nations. In particular, it has proved difficult to clearly define the social and economic rationale for the legal control of money laundering in these jurisdictions.
The movement from an economic rationale, which legitimises the control of all laundered money, to a crime rationale, which emphasises the control only of the proceeds of certain high-risk areas of criminality, arguably results in a 'blanket' approach to criminalisation that can fail to address the local concerns of developing countries. There are significant financial costs associated with the control of money laundering, associated with both the costs to government of establishing the national and international organizations needed to fight it, and with the compliance costs that accrue to businesses and entrepreneurs who are subject to these controls (Geiger and Wuensch 2007; Harvey 2004; Reuter and Truman 2004) . In particular, these costs are problematic for developing nations to bear, being almost as great as the direct costs associated with the fight against illegal enterprise and smuggling.
Despite this, action to combat money laundering remains necessary due to the facilitative effect that those proceeds have in terms of organised criminality (Levi 2002: 183-4 ). An examination of the circumstances surrounding the introduction of money laundering controls in one developing country, Kazakhstan, will highlight some of the problems with, and alternatives to, the blanket criminalisation of money laundering activities. Experience in Kazakhstan suggests that approaches such as an 'amnesty' on some forms of illegally-acquired capital can offset some of the potentially negative effects of money laundering, allowing for the root causes of the problem, namely predicate offending, to be tackled with more energy and resource.
The Wider Context of Money Laundering Controls
The international money laundering control system has its modern antecedents 1 in the early efforts at national controls instituted in the USA by the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 (Levi and Reuter 2006: 296) , and elsewhere. The 1970 Act required that all US banks provide a report to the Treasury on all financial transactions conducted in cash and exceeding $10,000 USD in value. This was a regulatory measure designed to prevent tax evasion; as such, the rationale behind its introduction was primarily economic in nature and so the law sought to control the effects of illicit money rather than the conduct that generated it. And this outlook informed the approach taken by the emergent international money laundering control system, in the form of the
Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), established in July 1989
at the G-7 Paris Economic Forum. This body assesses the effectiveness of national money laundering controls, and establishes model legislation and standards for its members. 2 Official statements made by FATF about the rationale underpinning the money laundering agenda have emphasised the corrosive effects of the proceeds of money laundering upon developing and established economies (FATF 2011: 9-10; Alldridge 2008) , and so roots the new regulatory system in the need to control 'threats to the integrity of the international financial system'. 3 The FATF's emphasis on economic harm also reflects concerns over the social effects of money laundering on GDP, standards of living, and mortality and literacy rates (FATF 2011: 9) .
The problem is that this rationale remains both empirically uncertain (Cuéllar 2003; Levi and Reuter 2006) and politically questionable; anti-money laundering policies arguably involve developed economies imposing restrictive controls onto developing 1 Older precedents can be traced back to the actions of Chinese traders in concealing assets several thousand years ago (Seagrave 1995) , and to the American mafia's legitimization of the proceeds of the illicit alcohol trade during the prohibition era (Haller 1990; Levi and Reuter 2006 (Alldridge 2008: 447) , and which can place additional financial limits onto developing economies already damaged by the movement of assets into the illicit economy in the first place. By emphasising the consequences of illicit financial practices, this approach treats all laundered money in the same way regardless of origin, and thus leads to enforcement approaches that emphasise procedural compliance and cast the net of monitoring and control widely, placing significant burdens onto national enforcement and implementation bodies; the cost of the anti-money laundering regime in the USA alone was estimated in 2003 at around $7 billion USD (Reuter and Truman 2004) . It is also entirely legitimate to query whether the funds that are being laundered would still merit criminalisation if they were being used in such a way as to produce more good than harm? Might it not make sense to permit a flow of money into a national economic system if such a measure would assist in state restructuring and lead to better social outcomes?
This economic rationale has also been undermined by the subsequent shift in attention on the part of national and international enforcement and money laundering control regimes, away from a regulatory approach to finance and towards the policing of financial activities which are prioritised not for their macro-economic impact, but because they relate to socially dangerous criminal activities that constitute political problems for Western governments (Garland 2001; Simon 2007) .
By the mid-1980s, the 'war on drugs' in the USA had refocused money laundering controls onto tackling the processing of cash derived from drug dealing and smuggling (Levi 2002: 186; Levi and Reuter 2006: 296) ; 'following the money' was seen as an effective way to disrupt these criminal activities. This focus on drug proceeds can be seen at an international level in the terms of the United Nations
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 (the Vienna Convention). Similarly, the post-9/11 era has seen a new emphasis on terrorist financing, in order to both limit the capacity of terrorists to act and to inculpate those who support or facilitate that action (Levi and Gilmore 2002) . ' (FATF 2012: 34) . This creates an extended international mechanism of crime control which serves two purposes; the prevention of criminal activity via indirect enforcement (particularly in areas where direct enforcement is difficult), and the regulation of the internal integrity of the market. The former rationale reflects the growth of pluralised, partnership-oriented, devolved models of crime control (Garland 2001) , and explains the emphasis on including all serious predicate offences; the latter explains the imposition of restrictive technical requirements (such as customer due diligence) and systems of reporting that apply to all forms of transaction, whether legitimate, illegitimate, or illegal, in order to establish ground-rules for entry and activity in the marketplace (Braithwaite 2008 ).
Both sides of this coin are 'intended to limit criminal access to the financial system' (Levi and Reuter 2006: 297) .
The global system of standard-setting and monitoring ensures that emergent markets are secure arenas for investment and commercial activity; in this sense, it is an engine of globalisation (Alldridge 2008 All of these consequences are tolerable so long as there is an understanding that the system works in the interests of the societies within which it applies; that it is reducing the ability of criminal actors to engage in the illegal, harmful activities that give rise to illicit funds, and that it is improving the capacity of national economic systems to deliver benefits to citizens (via security, stability, and wealth). The problem comes when it is applied in the context of a society where the sheer extent of the illicit economy is so great that the national economy is seriously compromised.
A country that is in this position might benefit from the development of laws to prevent the distortion of the economy, and thus acquire the legitimacy required in order to play a part in the world market. But establishing rigid firewalls against the legalization of illicit property while it constitutes a large proportion of the national economy may narrow that country's capacity to redevelop its economic system. As such, there is a case for augmenting the use of criminalising anti-money laundering measures with other approaches so that the restrictiveness of the former acts to the benefit, and not the detriment, of the national economic system. This case will be demonstrated via reference to one particular national jurisdiction, Kazakhstan.
The Shadow Economy in the Republics of the former Soviet Union
After the collapse of the USSR and Europe's Eastern Bloc in the early 1990s, the newly independent Republics faced many tasks of infrastructure reconstruction and social modernisation. This included legal redevelopment, as these new States required legal systems that could address the realities of the modern international community, the creation of which would benefit from the accrued experience of more and 1992, as the Soviet Union collapsed, the government lost control of statesubsidised industries as its economic management capacity was reduced; private and criminal enterprises were able to acquire control of these industries and their assets cheaply. Third, after independence in 1993, this process of privatization, which had been unofficial, became a formal policy process, accelerating the passing of former public assets into private (and/or clandestine) hands (Olcott 2010: 135) .
Fourth, between 1993 and 1998, this illegally acquired wealth began to filter back into the legitimate economy in the form of foreign capital investment, assisted by a sharply rise in corruption in the public sector. Finally, since 1999, Kazakhstan has seen both the creation of the preconditions for legitimate economic growth, and the expansion of the shadow economy via smuggling, organised crime, and double-entry bookkeeping within industry, prompting the development of measures to address the issue of illegitimate capital (Darimbetov and Spanov 2001: 46-7) .
The effects of this shadow economy can be seen in almost all spheres of society (Nichols 2001 ). In the late 1990s, the annual volume of shadow capital transaction within Kazakhstan was estimated at $6-7 billion dollars, involving up to 15% of the economically active population of the country in activities that bypass the taxation, budgetary, and social security systems of the state (Kulekeev 1997) . Eilat and Zinnes (2002: 1239) estimated the shadow economy of Kazakhstan to be equivalent to 27% of national GDP, while Schneider (2003: 27) 
Kazakhstan's response to money laundering (II): Amnesty
The legal reforms outlined above focus on bringing Kazakh law into compliance with international laws governing the processing of the proceeds of crime. As discussed previously, however, this approach focuses attention onto one element of a much wider problem, and by imposing criminal controls onto the processing of illegallyacquired finances, validates the security and integrity of the national economic system by excluding illegitimate finance, thus facilitating investment (Alldridge 2008: 448-450) . This is a market-constituting effect, in that it enforces the boundaries of the marketplace and the limits of acceptable commercial conduct, protecting other market actors (Braithwaite 2008) . One of the problems with this approach is that it is designed to exclude the proceeds of unacceptable forms of criminal conduct and so creates a rigid 'firewall' between those proceeds and the mainstream economy. But in a country like Kazakhstan, where a significant proportion of the economy is in 'shadow', and not necessarily a result of criminal activity, this firewall has the effect of limiting the ability of the state to 'reclaim' those assets for investment in lawful commercial enterprises, and thus for official declaration and taxation. If the predicate conduct giving rise to the proceeds is not itself a serious criminal matter, then criminalising the subsequent use of those proceeds significantly widens the criminal law into an area where the putative benefits of control are much harder to demonstrate (Alldridge 2008: 451) . As such, there is a case to be made for the development of state responses that better facilitate the reclamation of illicit assets, and thus economic development processes. was experiencing a lack of investment funds to facilitate the development of its economic infrastructure; there was a clear economic benefit to be gained from bringing a proportion of the shadow economy into the mainstream by making 'opponents' free to invest in legitimate fields. At the same time, the state lacked the capacity to make a significant dent in the existing problem of the illegitimate economy via a criminal enforcement approach; an amnesty represented an approach which would bypass the limitations of law enforcement.
Thus, on 2 April 2001 an Act entitled 'Amnesty for the Citizens of the Republic of
Kazakhstan in connection with the laundering of money' was adopted into law, allowing for the exclusive one-time legalization of assets that were previously withdrawn from legal economic circulation and had not been declared for tax purposes, and which resulted from the perpetration of certain economic offenses.
The Act proscribed a thirty-day period during which such funds could be transferred without the proper dispositions into special accounts held by second-tier banks, meaning that any deposits would be safeguarded by the banking sector's system of collective guarantee. Although the Act stipulated that the amnesty did not apply to the legalization of money derived from corruption offences, or offences against either the person, the constitution, national security, private property, public order, or public health and morals, as well as money belonging to others or received as loans, the reality was that the state had little capacity to effectively determine the origins of the money being legalized. And although this initial amnesty period was extended for a short while, the process did not bring significant inflows of funds into the national economy; approximately 70.5 billion KZT was leveraged (approximately $480 million USD), of which 88.5% took the form of cash receipts (82% in US dollars) and 11% ($50.5 million USD) non-cash deposit transfers from accounts held in foreign banks.
The maximum individual amount legalized was $800,000 USD cash, and the average deposit size was $164,000 USD; some 70% of legalized assets were subsequently left on deposit in the banking system. 
Conclusions
The notion of 'amnesty' is compatible with a conception of money laundering that views the wrongfulness of the act as residing in remote economic harms that accrue to the financial system, rather than as a form of complicity in the predicate offence that generated the money (Alldridge 2008: 457) . Such a conception reflects the approach originally taken in international money laundering circles. Seeing the harm caused by laundering in economic terms means that it is notionally possible, therefore, to measure that harm against a countervailing economic benefit, and determine that the legalization of illicit capital might produce benefits that outweigh 6 This legalization was connected with the introduction of new tax code which significantly decreased value added tax from 20% to 16%, and social tax from 26% to 21%. 7 http://www.rg.ru/Anons/arc_2001/0619/5.shtm those harms, and thus present a preferable option. For a country like Kazakhstan, this allowed for the recovery of significant funds to assist in the development of the legitimate economy. These funds bring back into mainstream circulation assets that would otherwise remain unusable, much of which passed into the hands of their current owners during the transition to independence. Amnesties thus contribute to the market-constituting aims of money laundering regimes, in that they expand the regulated space within which commerce can occur (Braithwaite 2008) . Of course, the proposition that amnesties on the laundering of illicit money can be desirable must not be interpreted as an argument in favour of removing criminal law prohibitions on money laundering entirely; the need to enforce against recognised predicate offences, particularly those relating to serious and organised crime, requires that national legal systems have effective criminal offences, backed up with appropriately stringent monitoring systems. But the application of these measures in the context of a transitional state can entrench existing problems, maintaining the division between legitimate and illegitimate economies.
As such, there is a need to look beyond the crime control rationale to determine whether there are illegitimate assets within the shadow economy that merit recovery;
funds that accrue from untaxed or informal work, proceeds acquired during the early days of independence, or assets deriving from unregulated or unofficial commerce, can all be constructively used within the legitimate economy. These forms of illegitimate property do not have the connection to an underlying serious predicate offence that would merit criminalisation according to the 'crime control' rationale. As such, it is harder to justify the blanket criminalisation of those resources. It is clear that Kazakhstan's desire to encourage inward investment and economic growth requires it to demonstrate that it has a robust financial system and takes active steps to prevent the permeation of the economy by organised crime. But there are also untapped funds within its borders, many of which remain inaccessible once antimoney laundering controls are put in place. These assets distort formal understandings of the state of the economy, and can lead to the pursuit of policy choices that are less than optimal. Kazakhstan's experience of an amnesty on the legalization of illegally acquired capital was that the shadow economy was weakened, there was a significant increase in investment in legitimate businesses, and the revenue that the state obtained from them was increased. Temporary
